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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine,
Michelle Alexandria Holt exercised her constitutional right to a jury trial. She was found guilty
as charged, and received a sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, but the district court
retained jurisdiction.
On appeal, she asserts that in its closing arguments, the prosecution improperly bolstered
the testimony of its witnesses and diminished the State’s burden of proof. Ms. Holt also asserts
that the district court violated her constitutional rights to appeal, to maintain her innocence, and
to due process when it asked her if she was going to “stick by” the version of events she testified
to at trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately seven o’clock in the morning on May 4, 2016, Officer Alan Speer was
waiting outside a residence for Michelle Alexandria Holt. (Trial Tr., p.30, L.6 – p.31, L.1.) He
believed she had an active arrest warrant. (Trial Tr., p.30, Ls.12-19.) When Officer Speer saw a
car being driven by Ms. Holt, he stopped the car, and, after verifying with dispatch that Ms. Holt
had an active arrest warrant, Officer Speer had her to step out of the car and then handcuffed her.
(Trial Tr., p.31, Ls.2-4; p.31, Ls.12-15; p.64, Ls.3-11; p.82, Ls.3-16.) After he handcuffed her,
Officer Speer searched Ms. Holt. (Trial Tr., p.35, Ls.17-20.) When he came to her right
sweatshirt pocket, he pulled out a baggie containing a crystal substance that resembled
methamphetamine.

(Trial Tr., p.37, Ls.8-12; p.38, Ls.14-18.)

Ms. Holt was charged by

Information with felony possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.39-40.)
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A one day jury trial was held. (See Trial Tr.) At trial, David Sincerbeaux, a forensic
scientist employed by the Idaho State Police Lab, testified that the substance found in Ms. Holt’s
pocket contained methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.71, Ls.9-15; p.74, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holt testified
that she was wearing clothing that was not hers and that she had never worn before when she was
stopped by Officer Speer. (Trial Tr., p.77, L.8 – p.78, L.11; p.79, Ls.13-14.) She testified that
she was in a hurry to get to the store and grabbed some clothes from a pile designated to go to
the Goodwill. (Trial Tr., p.77, L.13 – p.79, L.12.)
When discussing the elements of the charge during her closing remarks to the jury, the
prosecutor said, regarding the methamphetamine, “so what a substance is, again, I submit to you
that that’s not really an issue for you. You can kind of check off that portion of the element.”
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.5-8.) The prosecutor told the jury, “[y]ou heard from David Sincerbeaux,
who has over a decade of experience working as a scientist, tested this substance. He told you
it’s methamphetamine, so no real doubt as to that element, that it was methamphetamine, so the
only word in element number three that you really have to look at is possessed.” (Trial
Tr., p.102, Ls.8-14.)
The jury found Ms. Holt guilty of possessing a controlled substance. (R., pp.111, 167.)
At Ms. Holt’s sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence of four years, with
two years fixed. (3/14/17 Tr., p.146, L.2 – p.147, L.3.) The district court questioned Ms. Holt
about her previous misrepresentations on the GAIN evaluation and in the PSI. (3/14/17
Tr., p.158, L.8 – p.159, L.8.) She admitted that those evaluations mis-evaluated her for her
addiction. (3/14/17 Tr., p.159, Ls.2-8.) The court lectured Ms. Holt on the importance of being
honest. (3/14/17 Tr., p.158, L.8 – p.160, L.24.) The court asked her if she knew, before she
came in to her sentencing hearing, that it was important for her to be honest with the judge that is
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sentencing her. (3/14/17 Tr., p.160, Ls.4-7.)

The court then asked her whether she was

continuing to maintain that the story she told at trial was true. (3/14/17 Tr., p.160, Ls.9-24.)
Judge Mitchell said that it found her version of events—the facts she testified to at trial—to be
“preposterous.” (3/14/17 Tr., p.160, Ls.19-20.) The court asked her if she wanted “to stick by
that story?” (3/14/17 Tr., p.160, Ls.22-23.) Ms. Holt said she did, and the district court allowed
her to allocute before it pronounced her sentence. (3/14/17 Tr., p.160, L.24 – p.162, L.15.)
The district court then sentenced her to seven years, with three years fixed. (3/14/17
Tr., p.161, L.20 – p162, L.1.; R., p.124.) The court retained jurisdiction over Ms. Holt, but
warned her, “I want to help you get that help, but if you show me again your steadfast ability to
lie, then you need to know I have to protect the public, and I will do so by imposing your prison
sentence.” (3/14/17 Tr., p.164, Ls.8-12.) A Judgment of Conviction was entered on March 14,
2017. (R., pp.124-126.) On April 18, 2017, Ms. Holt filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.131133.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments?

II.

Did the district court’s questioning of Ms. Holt at her sentencing hearing impermissibly
infringe upon her constitutional rights to appeal, to maintain her innocence, and to due
process?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments
A.

Introduction
Ms. Holt asserts that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, misrepresented the State’s burden of proof
and bolstered a State’s witness’s testimony. Ms. Holt asserts that the prosecutor’s improper
closing arguments lowered the State’s burden of proof, which requires reversal of her conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). To prove an error is fundamental, a defendant bears the burden of proving:
(1) the error violated one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error
is obvious from the existing record; and (3) the error was not harmless. Id.; State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 226 (2010). If a defendant demonstrates one of his unwaived constitutional rights
was plainly violated, this Court applies the harmless error test to determine whether the
defendant has shown there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If so, the conviction is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 228. Ms. Holt acknowledges that she did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s
statements and thus the statements must be evaluated as fundamental error.
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C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Misstating The State’s
Burden Of Proof And Bolstering The Testimony Of A Critical State’s Witness
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion—basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due
process.’” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Additionally, the
Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, “[n]o person shall be … deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.” IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal
trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318
(Ct. App. 2005). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219
(1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
“Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they

6

will give to counsel for the accused.”

State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 611

(1903). The prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only
competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id.
The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)
(internal punctuation marks omitted). “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.”
(Ct. App. 2008).

State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20

Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 769 (1993); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).

“It is improper to

misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” Moses, 156 Idaho at 871
(quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)). Nor should closing argument
include counsel’s personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of
the accused. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979).
Although a prosecutor has considerable latitude in conducting closing arguments and can
argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence, a prosecutor should avoid expressing a
personal belief as to the credibility of the witnesses unless the comment is based solely on the
evidence. State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715 (Ct. App. 2003).
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1.

The Prosecutor Reduced The State’s Burden Of Proof

The prosecutor’s closing statements reduced the State’s burden of proof—essentially, the
prosecutor told the jury that they did need to determine whether the substance was
methamphetamine—the State had already proved it was and the jury need only look at the
possession portion of the element. However, the prosecutor’s directives to the jury eliminated
the State’s burden to prove the identity of the substance, thereby lowering the State’s burden.

2.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When It Bolstered The Credibility Of A
Critical Witness

The State did not seek to admit into evidence a written test result to confirm that the
substance Officer Speer found in Ms. Holt’s pocket was methamphetamine.

Instead, the

prosecutor simply called the lab employee, David Sincerbeaux, and asked him the test result.
(Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.1-2.)
During closing statements, the prosecutor told the jurors,
The second part of element number three is that she possessed any amount of
methamphetamine, so what a substance is, again, I submit to you that that’s not
really an issue for you. You can kind of check off that portion of the element.
You heard from David Sincerbeaux, who has over a decade of experience
working as a scientist, tested this substance. He told you it’s methamphetamine,
so no real doubt as to that element, that it was methamphetamine, so the only
word in element number three that you really have to look at is possessed. . .
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.4-14.)
The prosecution asked the jury to make a decision after telling them that the identity of
the substance was “not really an issue for you” and that the jurors could “check off that portion
of the element,” because its witness, Mr. Sincerbeaux, was an experienced scientist. (Trial
Tr., p.102, Ls.4-12.) The prosecution’s statements improperly bolstered the testimony of its
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witness, which appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury and violated Ms. Holt’s right
to due process and a fair trial.
3.

The Prosecutor’s Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Requiring This
Court To Vacate Ms. Holt’s Conviction

Ms. Holt did not object to the prosecutor’s improper arguments; however, she asserts that
the prosecutor’s argument amounts to fundamental error necessitating this Court to vacate her
conviction. “Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts
may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question
qualifies as fundamental error[.]” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. “Such review includes a three-prong
inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Id. at 228.

a.

By Telling The Jurors That There Was No Real Doubt As To Whether
The State Had Proven The Substance Was Methamphetamine Because
The State’s Witness Was An Experienced Scientist, And That The
Question Of Whether The Substance Was Methamphetamine Was Not
Really An Issue For The Jury, The Prosecutor Lowered Its Burden Of
Proof And Attempted To Secure A Guilty Verdict By Improper Means,
Thus Violating Ms. Holt’s Fourteenth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
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inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
With respect to due process, the United States Supreme Court has explained why the
prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness’s credibility or express a personal opinion of the
defendant’s guilt, stating:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho at 721 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)).
“[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error
only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not
have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should
be disregarded.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001)); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014)
(holding that prosecutorial misconduct was not fundamental error where improper statements
about nightmares or child suffering were not made or dwelled upon in support of a harsher
punishment and did not misrepresent the evidence that was presented to the jury.) “It follows
that a misstatement to a jury of the State’s burden rises to the level of fundamental error because
it goes to the foundation of the case and would take away from a defendant a right essential to
his or her defense.”

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding the

prosecutor’s distortion of the State’s burden of proof in closing argument was fundamental error
and highly prejudicial).
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In order to find Ms. Holt guilty of possession of methamphetamine, the jury had to find
the State proved that Ms. Holt possessed methamphetamine. (R., p.97.) By misstating the
burden of proof—telling the jury that the question of whether the substance was
methamphetamine was not really an issue for the jury—the prosecution deprived Ms. Holt of a
right essential to her defense which goes to the foundation of the case. This was fundamental
error. See Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685.
Further, by bolstering the testimony of the only witness who had conclusively identified
the substance as one containing methamphetamine, the State improperly put the weight of its
office behind Mr. Sincerbeaux’s testimony. The prosecutor’s misconduct violated Ms. Holt’s
due process right to a fair trial.

b.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face

The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
believe that Ms. Holt’s counsel was “sandbagging” the district court by failing to object to the
prosecutor misstating its burden of proof and by bolstering the testimony of its sole witness on
the issue of whether the substance was methamphetamine. The elements the State must prove in
order for the jury to convict a defendant of possession of a controlled substance are wellestablished.

See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999). There is simply no strategic

advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to correct, the
prosecutor’s misstatement of its burden of proof.

Nor is there any advantage in allowing the

prosecutor to bolster its witness’s credibility where the jury, in order to find the defendant guilty,
must find that witness’s testimony as to the identity of the substance credible. Therefore, the
prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.
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c.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless

Because Ms. Holt did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, she bears
“the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Ms. Holt asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of her trial.
Whether Ms. Holt knowingly possessed methamphetamine was the central issue for the
jury to decide. It is quite possible that the jurors relied on the prosecutor’s bolstering of
Mr. Sincerbeaux’s testimony.

It is quite possible, even likely, that the jurors believed the

prosecutor’s representation that it the identity of the substance is “not really an issue for you,”
thus there was “no real doubt as to that element.” (Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.4-12.) However, written
test results or a lab report confirming that the substance was methamphetamine were never
admitted into evidence at trial.

The only evidence confirming that the substance was

methamphetamine came from Mr. Sincerbeaux’s testimony.

In sum, there is a reasonable

possibility that the jurors took the prosecutor’s statements vouching for Mr. Sincerbeaux’s
testimony, combined with the prosecutor’s statement that it had already proved one part of the
element so the jury would not have to consider whether the state had proved it was
methamphetamine, and concluded that they did not need to consider whether the State had
proved that the substance contained methamphetamine. There is a reasonable possibility that,
had they required the State to carry its burden to prove the substance was methamphetamine, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. The prosecutorial misconduct in this case
was not harmless because the State never submitted the test into evidence and relied solely on a
bolstered witness’s testimony to prove the identity of the substance.
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Here, the prosecutor’s comments misstated the State’s burden of proof, and, where the
State’s case was entirely reliant upon the testimony of Mr. Sincerbeaux to prove the substance
was methamphetamine, the prosecutor’s improper bolstering impacted the verdict. The Court
should find that the misconduct denied Ms. Holt her right to a fair trial because it cannot say,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that misconduct did not contribute to the verdict. In reviewing the
trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments, constituting misconduct, likely influenced
the jury.

II.
The District Court Violated Ms. Holt’s Rights To Maintain Her Innocence And Appeal
And Her Right To Due Process By Asking Her Multiple Questions Designed To Elicit An
Admission Of Guilt At Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Ms. Holt asserts that her rights to appeal, to due process, and to maintain her innocence,

guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated when the district court, at the sentencing
hearing, asked her repeatedly whether she was going to “stick by her story” that she testified to at
trial. Ms. Holt asserts that the district court’s improper questioning at sentencing violated her
rights and requires a new sentencing hearing.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court exercises free review when determining whether constitutional rights

have been violated in light of the facts of the individual case. State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738,
740 (2007). Sentencing decisions are evaluated for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 284 (2003).

In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, the
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reviewing court looks at: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within
the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015).

C.

The District Court Violated Ms. Holt’s Right To Appeal, Right To Maintain Her
Innocence, And Right To Due Process By Asking Her Multiple Questions Designed To
Elicit An Admission Of Guilt
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may not penalize a

defendant for exercising his right to put the government to its burden of proof at trial, or to
maintain his innocence throughout sentencing and beyond so that he may also exercise his right
to an appeal. State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 157 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding “the defendant
retains the right to appeal the judgment of conviction. A court should not coerce a defendant into
sacrificing the right to assert innocence by threatening a more severe sentence.”); see also
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 814, (Ct. App. 2010). However, a sentencing court can use the
defendant’s unwillingness to acknowledge guilt in its determination of whether the defendant is
capable of rehabilitation. Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 157; Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Supreme Court held that where a
defendant prevails on appeal, but receives a harsher sentence after retrial, that sentence will be
presumed to have been imposed out of vindictiveness and is a violation of due process. Id. at
724. In so holding, the Court noted that:
[T]he imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having successfully pursued
a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be . . . a violation of due
process of law. “A new sentence, with enhanced punishment, based upon such a
reason, would be a flagrant violation of the rights of the defendant.” A court is
“without right to . . . put a price on an appeal. A defendant’s exercise of a right
of appeal must be free and unfettered . . . . [I]t is unfair to use the great power
given to the court to determine sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of
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making an unfree choice.” This Court has never held that the States are required
to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once
established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can
only impede open and equal access to the courts.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Although it appears that no published decision has ever presumed vindictiveness in a
sentencing court’s decision to weigh a defendant’s claims of innocence against him, some have
found due process violations in sentencing courts’ decisions to do so. For example, in Poteet v.
Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3rd Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found a due process
violation where the sentencing judge implicitly told the defendant that, had he abandoned his
claim of innocence, he would have received a lighter sentence. Id. at 396-398. In so holding, the
Court quoted a New Jersey Supreme Court justice with approval: “A trial judge may not
penalize a defendant for not admitting guilt and expressing remorse once the jury has found him
guilty. Such an admission might jeopardize his right of appeal or a motion for a new trial.” Id.
at 396 (quoting State v. Poteet, 295 A.2d 857, 860-861 (N.J. 1972) (Jacobs, J., concurring)).
Another example can be found in People v. Byrd, 487 N.E. 2d 1275 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986).
In that case, the Court, citing cases which ultimately have their genesis in Poteet, held that:
A more severe sentence may not be imposed because a defendant refuses to
abandon his claim of innocence, or because he has exercised his constitutional
right to trial. In determining whether sentencing was improperly influenced by a
defendant’s failure to admit his guilt following a conviction, the court’s focus is
upon whether the sentencing court indicated, either expressly or impliedly, that
there would be better treatment on sentencing if the defendant abandoned his
claim of innocence. Here, the court specifically referred to defendant’s continued
denial of any involvement. Therefore, we must conclude that defendant’s
sentence was improperly influenced by his continuing denial of guilt. Defendant’s
sentence must be vacated and a new sentencing hearing must be held without
consideration of his continuing denial of guilt.
Id. at 1280 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Another example can be found in State v. Cesnik, 122 P. 3d 456 (Mont. 2005). In that
case, just as in Poteet, the Court found it significant that any admission of guilt at the time of
sentencing would have necessarily “rendered his appeal meaningless” and it held “that a
sentencing court may not punish a defendant for failing to accept responsibility for the crime
when that defendant has expressly maintained his innocence and has a right to appeal his
conviction.” Id. at 462. In doing so, it quoted with approval from another Montana Supreme
Court decision which had observed that, because Montana offers appeals for criminal cases,
“compelling a defendant ‘to admit guilt as a condition to his continued freedom’ would render
meaningless our criminal justice system.” Id. (quoting State v. Imlay, 91 P.2d 979, 984 (Mont.
1991)).
At sentencing, the district court questioned Ms. Holt:
THE COURT: Did your attorney ever talk to you about being honest?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t think that specific topic has came up -THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: -- more or less in our case.
THE COURT: Your father ever talk to you about being honest?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. So you had an idea prior to coming into this hearing that
it’s important to be honest with the judge that’s considering what to do with your
situation. Would that be correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. The story about getting the bag of clothes from
someone you knew, I think it was your brother -- I’m certainly familiar with your
brother -- is that true?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s true.
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THE COURT: You understand the jury did not buy that?
THE DEFENDANT: That’s -- yes, I was there.
THE COURT: Unanimously.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:
preposterous.

Do you understand that I don’t believe that?

I find it

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: Do you want to stick by that story?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. That was true.
THE COURT: All right. I really don’t have any other questions.
(Tr., p.159, L.20 – p.161, L.1.)
Here, after questioning Ms. Holt about the version of events she testified to at trial, the
district court fashioned an underlying sentence considerably harsher than what was
recommended by the State. (Trial Tr., p.161, L.20 – p.162, L.4 (district court imposing seven
years, with three fixed); c.f., Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.2-3 (prosecutor recommending a sentence of
four years, with two years fixed).) Thus, it appears that Ms. Holt’s sentence was improperly
influenced by her continuing denial of guilt. There is no indication that the district court was
considering Ms. Holt’s assertion of innocence in assessing her potential for rehabilitation,
instead, it sought to elicit a confession from Ms. Holt that she did not truthfully testify at trial—
essentially asking her to admit that she had perjured herself when testifying at her trial.
These statements do not involve a district court’s consideration of whether a defendant
has accepted responsibility, such as in the cases of Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Kellis, but relate
directly to a defendant’s right to maintain her innocence. Ms. Holt asserts that the questions put
to her at sentencing were an attempt to coerce her into confessing that her trial testimony was

17

false.

The court’s questions and statements were not considerations about rehabilitative

potential, but were attempts to elicit an admission of guilt which amounts to violations of
Ms. Holt’s rights to maintain her innocence and appeal, and her right to due process. Should this
Court find these questions do not amount to a violation of Ms. Holt’s Constitutional rights, the
questions certainly constitute direct evidence that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Holt respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and remand this
matter for a new trial. In the alternative, Ms. Holt requests that her case be remanded for
resentencing by a different district court judge.
DATED this 17th day of November, 2017.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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